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Abstract: : In his Quodlibetal Questions and 
other texts, John Duns Scotus makes the 
seemingly-startling claim that angels or way-
farers achieve self-knowledge without recog-
nizing God as their exemplar. I will show how 
this critique of images follows from Scotus’s 
deeper, more general, rejection of theories 
of analogy. Despite curtailing the image as a 
means of understanding God, angels, as well 
as certain wayfarers, are capable of distinct 
natural abstractive cognition of God accord-
ing to Scotus. 
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Resumen: En sus Cuestiones Quodlibetales y 
en otros textos, Juan Duns Escoto aﬁ rma, de 
modo aparentemente sorprendente, que los 
ángeles o los viatores se autoconocen sin re-
conocer a Dios como su ejemplar. Mostraré 
cómo esta crítica de las imágenes se deriva 
del rechazo por parte de Escoto, más pro-
fundo y general, de las teorías de la analogía. 
A pesar de limitar la imagen como un medio 
para la comprensión de Dios, los ángeles, 
además de ciertos viatores, son capaces de 
un conocimiento abstractivo distinto y natu-
ral de Dios, según Escoto.
Palabras clave: Duns Escoto, conocimiento 
intuitivo y abstractivo, imago Dei, conoci-
miento angélico.
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I n his Quodlibetal Questions, John Duns Scotus makes what seems to be a startling claim: “While it may be true that both angel and soul are able to know themselves naturally for the absolute 
things they are, they cannot know themselves naturally to the extent 
that they are images of God. In other words, they are not aware 
that they are images of God”1. As Scotus here states, angels or way-
farers might achieve self-knowledge and yet not recognize God as 
their exemplar and themselves as its imitation. Despite initial ap-
pearances, the concern of this passage and others like it, however, is 
not whether or not such rational creatures are in fact imagines Dei. 
Instead, the mimetic agnosia discussed here reﬂ ects a deeper, more 
general, assault on theories of analogy by Scotus. 
In what follows, I will show why Scotus rejects images as a 
viable means of cognizing God. Using angels as a test-case, whose 
intellectual cognition he believes to be the same as ours in its pure 
condition, will reveal the hermeneutical inadequacy of images. His 
critique of images, I will argue, exempliﬁ es a more general princi-
ple of his metaphysics: creatures both are and must be considered 
beings in their own right before they are or can be considered qua 
their relation of imitation or participation. Although Scotus cur-
tails the image as a means of understanding God, he nevertheless 
elevates both angelic and human cognition of God to another level. 
That is, as for an angel, the wayfarer is capable of distinct natural 
abstractive cognition of God based on intellectual memory. As I will 
show, this does not threaten the distinction between natural cogni-
tion and supernatural beatitude. 
1. J. D. SCOTUS, God and Creatures: The Quodlibetal Questions, trans. Felix Alluntis, 
Allan B. Wolter (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1975) q. 14, a. 3, n. 79. 
Hereafter “Quodlibetal.” For references to the Ordinatio and Lectura, see Ioannis 
Duns Scoti, Opera Omnia (Vatican City, Vatican Polyglot Press, 1950-). For the 
Reportatio, see Duns Scotus, The Examined Report of the Paris Lecture Reportatio 
I-A: Latin Text and English Translation, vol. 1 and 2, trans. and ed. Allan B. Wolter, 
Oleg V. Bychkov (St. Bonaventure, The Franciscan Institute, 2004 and 2008). All 
translations, with the exception of those from the Quodlibetal and Reportatio, are 
my own.
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1. ANGELIC COGNITION, INTELLIGIBLE SPECIES, AND IMAGES
An image, as Scotus frequently deﬁ nes it throughout his corpus, 
is something representing a whole perfectly and by means of imi-
tation2. Unlike a mere vestige, perfect representation of a whole 
means that the image captures its object according to a complete 
ratio. He explains that when, for example, an animal’s whole body is 
impressed in sand —we might think of a fossil— such a representa-
tion of the whole animal qua ratio of animal or insect (and not just 
one of its bodily parts) provides an image3. 
An image differs from a mere vestige insofar as the latter rep-
resents the whole imperfectly and the part perfectly, and by means 
of similarity (not imitation). Thus, he states “what is a vestige of the 
whole is an image of the part.”4 Scotus cites the example of a foot in 
the sand, whose vestige (i.e., the footprint) represents some fugitive 
animal, but only imperfectly. The vestigial footprint does not lead 
one to an immediate cognition of the whole5. Without a shared ratio 
with the animal itself, such a trace warrants us to reason or other-
wise infer (sed tantum arguitive) something about the whole, but it 
does not lead to the immediate cognition of it. On this account, an 
image surpasses the vestigial trace.
Furthermore, such representation by an image transpires not 
only by means of similarity, which a vestige achieves; it also must 
imitate that which it images. Imitation requires a likening of the 
image to the imaged such that the latter serves as the exemplar and 
measure of the former. The image inherently references and re-
lates to its exemplar without which it cannot be what it is. For this 
reason, citing Augustine, Scotus states that two eggs are similar to 
one another, but the one does not imitate the other. To reach the 
level of imitation, there must be an order of hierarchy and priority 
between the two. 
2. See, for example, SCOTUS, Reportatio cit., I-A, d. 3, qq. 3 and 7; Lectura cit., I, d. 3, 
qq. 2-3; and Ordinatio cit., I, d. 3, qq. 2-3.
3. Ibidem. 
4. “[...] quod est vestigium totius est imago partis.” SCOTUS, Reportatio cit., I-A, d. 3, 
q. 3, n. 76.
5. See, for example, SCOTUS, Lectura cit., I, d. 3, p. 2, q. unica, n. 293.
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To understand why Scotus curtails our ability to recognize 
ourselves as an imago Dei, or image of God, we must look at the 
means by which a ﬁ nite intellect can cognize God qua its ﬁ nite natu-
ral condition. Insofar as angels have the same cognitive faculties as 
us, albeit in an unhampered condition, they provide an idealized 
test case of what can be known and how. To this end, I follow Sco-
tus in asking: Do angels have actual natural and distinct knowledge 
(notitia) of the divine essence?6 In answering yes to this question, he 
also shows why such cognition does not transpire through images. 
Before answering this question, three terms must be high-
lighted: natural; distinct; and notitia. With respect to the ﬁ rst, Sco-
tus like most of his medieval peers opposes natural to supernatural 
knowledge, the latter clearly demarcated as the domain of beatitude. 
Although he will answer the question in the afﬁ rmative, he insists 
that such distinct knowledge remains natural. To make this case, 
as we shall see, Scotus will need to employ his famed distinction 
between intuitive and abstractive cognition. 
Second, distinct knowledge can be contrasted to indistinct 
knowledge, for example, the type of knowledge most often possessed 
by us in the wayfarer state. We enjoy only indistinct knowledge such 
that even if we form concepts proper to the divine essence, they are 
complex concepts incorporating a multiplicity of common simply-
simple elements (e.g., ens inﬁ nitum). The caveat “most often” should 
suggest that another, higher, form of knowledge is possible even in 
the wayfarer state.
And third, notitia—a term for which there is no perfect transla-
tion—must be distinguished from knowledge in the sense of scientia. 
That is, notitia is not discursive reasoning of the kind laboriously un-
dertaken by humans, running hither and thither between terms of the 
premises and conclusion. Instead, it is a type of simple acquaintance7. 
6. See “De cognitione angelorum” in SCOTUS, Lectura cit., II, d. 3, p. 2, q. 2 and 
Ordinatio cit., II, d, 3, p. 2, q. 2. 
7. It might be close to what Bertrand Russell calls “knowledge by acquaintance” 
as opposed to “knowledge by description,” to borrow one of Allan Wolter’s fa-
vorite distinctions. See, for example, A. B. WOLTER, Language and Metaphysics, in 
M. MCCORD ADAMS (ed.), The Philosophical Theology of John Duns Scotus (Cornell 
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Given the lack of satisfactory single-word English equivalent, I will 
leave it mostly untranslated in what follows. 
To explain how angels cognize God short of supernatural cog-
nition, Scotus identiﬁ es two strong contenders: either the angel 
might possess an intelligible species distinctly representing the di-
vine essence; or it might reﬂ ect upon its own essence as an imago 
Dei (although the latter, as we will see, only yields indistinct notitia). 
Both Henry of Ghent and Thomas Aquinas reject the former op-
tion8. If a created intellect could represent the divine essence by 
means of an intelligible species, they object, then, it seems, beati-
tude would be awarded to such a creature in this life. A ﬁ nite intel-
lect would see the divine essence under the aspect of its deity. Al-
though Henry does not offer a satisfactory alternative to intelligible 
species according to Scotus, Aquinas opts for a natural cognition of 
the divine essence through itself as an imago Dei. 
Scotus faithfully explains Aquinas’s argument by recounting 
the Angelic Doctor’s three-fold method of cognition: one whereby 
we see the thing in itself; another we receive a similitude from the 
thing itself; and a third we receive a species, not from the thing 
itself, but from another in which the thing “shines forth” (relucet)9. 
As Aquinas himself explains, the ﬁ rst mode can be exempliﬁ ed by 
light as seen by the eye, or in the case at hand, cognizing God di-
rectly in his essence10. Although Aquinas holds that an angel knows 
itself in this manner, he reserves such direct vision of God for be-
atitude. According to the second mode, the eye, for example, sees 
a stone through its image or similitude. Likewise, an angel knows 
God through itself as an image or similitude of God. Aquinas limits 
this second mode of cognition to angels insofar as we humans know 
our soul only through an intermediate species and not immediately 
University Press, Ithaca, 1990) 54-67: 57-58. Aquinas deﬁ nes notitia as what the 
intellect conceives by cognizing. See SANCTI THOMAE AQUINATIS, Opera omnia 
iussu impensaque Leonis XIII P. M. edita, t. 4-5: Pars prima Summae theologiae (Ex 
Typographia Polyglotta S. C. de Propaganda Fide, Romae, 1888-1889) I, q. 34, 
a. 1, ad. 2. Hereafter: “ST.”
8. SCOTUS, Lectura cit., II, d. 3, p. 2, q. 2, nn. 270-277 and 280-282.
9. Ibidem, n. 281. 
10. AQUINAS, ST cit., I, q. 56, a. 3, resp. 
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in its essence11. Before delving into this further, we might mention 
the third mode, such as when we see the person but as reﬂ ected in a 
mirror. For us in our present condition, God is seen as if in a mirror 
insofar as we must come to know him as he shines forth in vestiges. 
From his traces found in creation, we reason backwards from such 
effects to their ﬁ rst cause (e.g., Aquinas’s Five Ways). 
Unlike embodied intellects, an angel knows God through this 
middle way of self-reﬂ ection for Aquinas because an image of God is 
impressed upon the angel’s very nature12. To cognize itself, Aquinas 
holds, an angel thus must recognize its model. For an image to be 
an image, it must inherently refer to that which it imitates. In this 
manner, an angel does not distinctly know the divine essence, but 
only grasps it indistinctly as its own essence refers to it as its exem-
plar13. Such indistinct cognition, however, requires moving between 
diverse (and not simply differing) rationes according to a theory of 
analogy. That is, the angel must move between lower and higher ra-
tiones essendi. And here is where imago Dei reasoning goes bankrupt 
according to Scotus. As will be discussed in the following section, 
such cognition requires a move between diverse rationes without 
mediation by a univocal concept of being. Before turning to this 
argument below, we must observe how Aquinas understands this 
process to transpire. 
Aquinas explains that no created similitude can represent the 
divine essence distinctly insofar as God’s mode of existence (i.e., as 
subsisting existence itself) radically exceeds all created modes of 
11. See, for example, SANCTI THOMAE AQUINATIS, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P. 
M. edita, t. 22: Quaestiones disputatae de veritate (Editori di San Tommaso, Roma, 
1975-1970-1972-1976) vol. 4, q. 10, a. 8, resp. Hereafter “De Veritate.”
12. “Cognitio autem qua Angelus per sua naturalia cognoscit Deum, media est inter 
has duas; et similatur illi cognitioni qua videtur res per speciem ab ea acceptam. 
Quia enim imago Dei est in ipsa natura Angeli impressa per suam essentiam, 
Angelus Deum cognoscit, inquantum est similitudo Dei. Non tamen ipsam es-
sentiam Dei videt, quia nulla similitudo creata est sufﬁ ciens ad repraesentandam 
divinam essentiam. Unde magis ista cognitio tenet se cum speculari, quia et ipsa 
natura angelica est quoddam speculum divinam similitudinem repraesentans.” 
AQUINAS, ST cit., I, q. 56, a. 3, resp. 
13. See, for example, AQUINAS, ST cit., I, q. 12, a. 4, ad. 1.
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knowing14. Anything that exceeds another cannot be comprehended 
by it because comprehension obtains a distinct and perfect grasp 
of its object15. To virtually comprehend something (as opposed to 
extensively comprehending something as one body comprehends 
another), the similitude must share something in common with its 
represented object, at least on a generic level. For example, a placard 
depicting dogs and cats might represent all animals. The depicted 
ﬁ gures generically share the form of animal in common with them. 
But a similitude that does not share even a generic ratio in com-
mon with its object (e.g., an accident representing a substance) only 
represents its object analogically. This is because it does not com-
prehend what is essential to its object, not even on the generic level. 
Remember, being is not a highest genus. 
God’s essence as ipsum esse subsistens occupies a higher order 
qua being than created essences, which must participate in their 
being. Even on the transcendental level, being is not shared univo-
cally in common between God and creatures. They each possess it 
according to diverse, but related, rationes16. Aquinas concludes from 
this that a created similitude only represents the divine essence ana-
logically17. Even with their pure intellection, angels naturally can 
know the divine essence only indistinctly insofar as their essences 
present an imago Dei. In themselves as images, they thus must recog-
nize the primary analogue imitated by their essences. Such analogi-
cal cognition is the limit of ﬁ nite intellects according to Aquinas. 
Only through the light of glory elevating the intellect to a higher 
14. AQUINAS, ST cit., I, q. 12, a. 4, resp. 
15. AQUINAS, De Veritate cit., q. 8, a. 2, resp. Comprehension entails perfect knowl-
edge. See also AQUINAS, ST I, q. 12, a. 7, resp. 
16. For this common deﬁ nition of analogy, see, for example, the following from Aqui-
nas: “Analogice dicitur praedicari quod praedicatur de pluribus quorum rationes 
diuersae sunt sed attribuuntur uni alicui eidem, sicut sanum dicitur de corpore 
animalis et de urina et de potione, sed non ex toto idem signiﬁ cat in omnibus.” 
AQUINAS, Opera Omnia Iussu Leonis XIII P.M. Edita, t. 43: De principiis naturae ad 
fratrem Sylvestrum. (Roma, Editori di San Tommaso, 1976) VI.
17. “Omnis autem similitudo divinae essentiae in intellectu creato recepta, non potest 
habere aliquam convenientiam cum essentia divina nisi analogiae tantum.” AQUI-
NAS, De Veritate cit., q. 8, a. 1, resp. 
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order do any creatures come to see the divine essence distinctly18. 
As we will now discuss, Scotus ﬁ nds such reasoning faulty due to 
the general problems he identiﬁ es surrounding a mere analogical 
predication of being. 
2. SCOTUS’S CRITIQUE OF IMAGO DEI
According to Scotus, an angel cannot reﬂ ect upon its essence and 
recognize itself as an image of God. Using a distinction he derives 
from Aquinas, he holds that there are two types of images and nei-
ther one of them sufﬁ ces for such notitia19. The ﬁ rst type of image 
represents another and is itself only a means of cognizing (ratio co-
gnoscendi) but not itself cognized, at least not immediately. The sec-
ond type of image is ﬁ rst cognized as itself something, which once 
cognized, leads to the cognition of another20. An example of the 
ﬁ rst would be a species in the eye, which only represents something 
else, but is not itself cognized. An image of the second variety would 
be, for example, a statue of Hercules. The statue does not lead to 
cognition of the other except insofar as the object itself is cognized. 
Unlike a representative species in the eye, leading immediately to 
that which it represents without directly showing itself, we initially 
encounter the second type of image as an object in itself, from which 
we then recognize that it represents such and such object21. And this 
occurs, Scotus tells us, discursively.
But for a theory such as Aquinas’s, neither type of image, 
Scotus argues, can lead to cognition of the divine essence22. The 
general ﬂ aw he ﬁ nds with such a hermeneutics of images lies in 
its analogical relationality: If we do not already know both abso-
lute terms of the relation, we cannot cognize the relation between 
18. AQUINAS, De Veritate cit., q. 8, a. 3, resp. 
19. See, for example, AQUINAS, De Veritate cit., q. 8, a. 5, resp. and ST cit. I, q. 12, a. 
9, resp. 
20. SCOTUS, Lectura cit., II, d. 3, p. 2, q. 2, nn. 283-284.
21. SCOTUS, Ordinatio cit., II, d. 3, p. 2, q. 2, n. 316.
22. SCOTUS, Lectura cit., II, d. 3, p. 2, q. 2, nn. 283-284.
ANUARIO FILOSÓFICO 49/3 (2016) 517-537
DUNS SCOTUS’S CRITIQUE OF IMAGES OF GOD
525
them23. He targets the type of analogical reasoning outlined above, 
which moves between terms lacking even a generic ratio in com-
mon. It is not that Scotus denies that creatures are in fact images 
of God or that there might be an analogical relationship between 
God and creatures or between substance and accident24. Instead, he 
denies that the cognition of the one term could lead to cognition of 
an unknown second term25.
Something has the capacity to represent only that which it 
contains the object’s intelligibility either formally or virtually26. A 
placard depicting a dog can represent all animals (or even all liv-
ing things) because dogs contain the intelligible note of animality. 
(The drawn image can represent dogs in the ﬁ rst place because of 
the common shape or form shared between the depiction and ac-
tual dogs.) An accident can represent substance or God, according 
to Scotus, but only qua being and only if they share the concept of 
being in univocally in common27. In this light, we can understand 
Scotus’s response to Aquinas. 
The ﬁ rst type of image would require that the angel be a spe-
cies of the divine essence. This is because images of this kind have 
the capacity to represent their objects insofar as they share a com-
mon form with it. For example, the species in the eye shares a form 
with the visible object although not its matter. It represents its ob-
ject because of the shared form. The form of a tree is both in the 
tree and in the eye, although in the later only formally28. In terms 
of angelic cognition, however, both Henry and Aquinas deny such 
species, which prompted the question in the ﬁ rst place. As Scotus 
explains: “Indeed they hold that nothing other than the essence of 
God is a means of cognizing it just as a similitude is a formal means 
of representation, since [the divine essence] is inﬁ nite.”29 That is, 
23. Scotus outlines four ways of knowing: proper; common; adventitious; and rela-
tional. SCOTUS, Reportatio cit., I-A, d. 3, q. 1, n. 42.
24. See, for example, SCOTUS, Quodlibetal cit., q. 14, a. 3, n. 89. 
25. SCOTUS, Quodlibetal cit., q. 14, a. 2, nn. 36-38.
26. See, for example, SCOTUS, Quodlibetal cit., q. 14, a. 3, n. 78. 
27. SCOTUS, Lectura cit., I, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 1-2, n. 112. 
28. SCOTUS, Quodlibetal cit., q. 14, a. 3, n. 78.
29. “Sed angelus non est imago primo modo, quia tunc esset species essentiae divi-
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nothing ﬁ nite such as an intelligible species can distinctly repre-
sent the divine essence because the divine essence is inﬁ nite30. Thus 
given Aquinas’s own commitments, the ﬁ rst type of images must be 
ruled out, although as will be discussed in Section 3 below, Scotus 
will defend the capacity of intelligible species to represent the divine 
essence under the aspect of its divinity.
With respect to the second type of image, cognition of the 
thing itself leads us to cognition of that which it imitates. Scotus had 
this type of image clearly in mind with his claim highlighted in the 
introduction, namely that angels and humans recognize themselves 
for the absolute things they are, but do not recognize themselves 
as images of God31. He responds to a possible counter-argument 
stating that either the image-relation is identical with the soul’s or 
angel’s essence or a necessary consequence of such. Either way, it 
seems according to the counter-argument, cognition of the essence 
leads to cognition of the relation. This is because such relations of 
essential dependence cannot be separated from that on which they 
depend. If x essentially depends upon y, x cannot be known to be 
what it is without also knowing y. This is the case with an image-re-
lation, such that it is a relation of dependence of the imitation upon 
the imitated. Cognition of one thus leads to cognition of the other32.
Scotus identiﬁ es a number of problems with using this sec-
ond type of image to cognize God. First, cognition of the image-
relation requires knowledge (notitia) of both terms: the imitator as 
well as the imitated33. This being the case, the angel would require 
a prior cognition of God (i.e., the imitated), which is what must be 
explained (i.e., how an angel knows God). It does not help to say 
the image includes the relation of imitation from its very essence 
as image34. For me to recognize the statue of Hercules as a statue of 
nae, quam negant: potunt enim nihil aliud ab essentia Dei est ratio cognoscendi 
ipsam sicut similitudo est ratio formalis repraesentandi, cum sit inﬁ nita.” SCOTUS, 
Lectura cit., II, d. 3, p. 2, q. 2, n. 283. 
30. See, for example, AQUINAS, ST cit., I, q. 12, aa. 2 and 9, resp. 
31. SCOTUS, Quodlibetal cit., q. 14, a. 3, nn. 80 and 82. 
32. Ibidem, n. 83. 
33. Ibidem, n. 82. 
34. Ibidem, n. 83. 
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Hercules (or even of some random person), I must already know the 
imitated term (i.e., Hercules, human being, etc.). This is why Scotus 
cites Augustine in saying we see the mirror, but we do not see it as 
a mirror35. To use a distinction from Stoicism, such images can be 
commemorative signs, but not indicative ones36. They are reminders of 
the divine for those who already know God.
Second, as Scotus argues directly against Aquinas, because cog-
nition of one thing leads to cognition of another, such a movement 
requires discursive reasoning. This is problematic for a number of 
reasons. First of all, most (including Aquinas) deny that angels rea-
son discursively37. Second, and more importantly for our considera-
tion, reasoning from an angel’s own essence as image to an indistinct 
cognition of God as its exemplar presupposes some concept of God 
to mediate the terms (i.e., image and imaged). As Scotus spelled out 
earlier in the Ordinatio against those who would reject univocity: 
“For if God is to be cognized in such a way through a creature, one 
must prepossess [praehabere] some concept about God, to which we 
reason, because discursion presupposes some concept of the term to 
which [termino ad quem].”38 Here we see the full weight of Scotus’s 
theory of univocity come to bear upon his critique of images39. 
All discursion, he maintains, presupposes a simple notion (noti-
tiam) of that to which we discursively reason40. As a process “leading 
to this from this,” discursion must presuppose terms between which 
it moves (i.e., terms to syllogize)41. It does not, however, itself yield 
such simple notions itself. Whether through our abstraction from 
the sensible data of intuition or through angelic reﬂ ection upon in-
telligible species, the discovery of simple (and simply-simple) terms 
occurs prior to discursion. If this were not the case, reasoning would 
35. Ibidem, n. 79 and Reportatio cit., I-A, d. 3, q. 7, n. 214.
36. G. MANETTI, Theories of the Sign in Classical Antiquity (Bloomington, Indiana Uni-
versity Press, 1993) 100-103.
37. AQUINAS, ST cit., I, q. 58, a. 3 and De Veritate cit., q. 8, a. 15.
38. SCOTUS, Ordinatio cit., I, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 1-2, n. 106. 
39. He explicates this more clearly in the Ordinatio account than the Lectura one, 
although it is implicit in the latter. 
40. SCOTUS, Ordinatio cit., II, d. 3, p. 2, q. 2, n. 316. 
41. SCOTUS, Lectura cit., II, d. 3, p. 2, q. 2, n. 284. 
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leap to an unknown conclusion without the mediation of the known. 
Discursion then concludes something about the presupposed sim-
ples according to a new composition; it is not itself a discover-plat-
form for unknown elements42. We discursively conclude, for exam-
ple, that “some being is inﬁ nite (or ﬁ rst)”. 
Even if one were to accept Scotus’s line of reasoning, however, 
why should we accept his initial claim that such cognition from im-
ages is discursive in the ﬁ rst place? The answer resides in the fact 
that the same reasoning invoked against analogy holds for images of 
the second kind. If an angel’s essence provides only content repre-
sentative of ﬁ nite being, which Aquinas’s theory of analogy entails, 
then an angel neither can abstract simple conceptual notes shared in 
common with God (let alone simple ones proper to God); nor can 
it discursively reason to an inﬁ nite being due to a lack of a media-
tion by a middle term. Images must somehow contain their imaged 
object, or be able to lead us to a cognition of it. The former Scotus 
subdivides into essential containment (e.g., a species contains the 
genus) and virtual containment (e.g., a subject contains its attrib-
utes). But no created essence, as we will see, contains anything prop-
erly representing God (even if indistinctly). What “shines-forth” 
(relucens) in a phantasm or an intelligible species cannot cause an 
analogical concept proper to God43. A concept, even stretched to 
its furthest potential, only represents that with which it shares a 
common element, even if only transcendentally44. For this reason, it 
cannot represent something with an altogether diverse ratio. 
Even if Aquinas were to accept discursive reasoning for an 
angel, no ﬁ nite intellect can reason from itself to cognition of God 
without something to mediate the two orders. All discursion, as we 
have discussed, presupposes simple notions of that to which it dis-
cursively reasons45. A prepossessed simple note representing God, 
42. See A. B. WOLTER, The Transcendentals and Their Function in the Metaphysics of 
Duns Scotus (St. Bonaventure, NY, The Franciscan Institute, 1946) 40-48.
43. See, for example, SCOTUS, Lectura cit., I, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 1-2, nn. 26-27.
44. Ibidem. 
45. SCOTUS, Ordinatio cit., II, d. 3, p. 2, q. 2, n. 316. See also Lectura cit., I, d. 3, p. 1, 
qq. 1-2, n. 27.
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however, must be either shared in common with creatures or proper 
to God alone. Any conceptual note shared in common between God 
and creatures would be a univocal concept, which both Aquinas and 
Henry deny. 
The possibility of a concept proper to God alone also can be 
ruled out for Aquinas and Henry, although not for Scotus as we will 
discuss in the following section. A created essence cannot contain a 
conceptual note proper to only God in the absence of God’s direct 
causal inﬂ uence. Scotus conﬁ rms this with a familiar argument used 
to defend univocity46. No object makes a distinct notion of another 
object unless it contains that other object virtually. He buttresses 
this claim with an appeal to Metaphysics II.1: status in being deter-
mines status in truth. Insofar as an angel does not virtually include 
God in entity, so too its cognitive content does not virtually contain 
any note properly representing God. 
Virtual containment means having the power (virtus) to pro-
duce something else, as an essence produces an attribute or premises 
produce a conclusion and thereby virtually contain it. This raises a 
further problem if the angel’s essence (as opposed to a representing 
species) were to contain its exemplar. If the angel’s essence were to 
cognize the divine essence as virtually contained in its own essence 
(i.e., as exemplar), which seems to be the default option in the absence 
of common univocal concepts, then the angel intuitively would cog-
nize God in cognizing its own essence47. Scotus explains that insofar 
as the angel intuitively cognizes its own essence, by extension, it intui-
tively cognizes anything contained therein. An intuitive cognition of 
the divine essence would be beatitude, which must be rejected.
46. “Conﬁ matur enim, quia nullum obiectum facit distinctam notitiam alterius 
obiecti nisi includat in se virtualiter illud aliud obiectum, -quia ‘unumquodque 
sicut se habet ad esse, sic ad cognosci’; quod igitur non includit aliquid virtualiter 
in entitate, non includit illud cognoscibilitate. Sed essentia angeli non includit 
virtualiter essentiam divinam sub ratione aliqua distincta; ergo nec sic cognosci 
eam.” SCOTUS, Ordinatio cit., II, d. 3, p. 2, q. 2, n. 317.
47. “Si autem non per discursum cognoscat, sed per hoc quod essentia divina in-
cluditur in essentia angeli, tunc intuitive cognosceret essentiam divinam, et essen-
tia divina virtualiter contineretur in essentia angeli (quod falsum est).” SCOTUS, 
Lectura cit., II, d. 3, p. 2, q. 2, n. 284.
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Scotus’s theory of univocity can bypass these cognitive dead 
ends by maintaining the following: True, a proper concept of God 
requires discursion, leading “hoc ex hoc.”48 Such is the nature of 
wayfarer scientia, which uses common transcendental concepts to 
form proper, yet complex conceptions of God. Our intellect leads 
us from this one to that one account of common content: we pre-
suppose cognition of the terminus ad quem (i.e., God) in the form of 
common univocal simples abstracted from sensible accidents (e.g., 
the concept of being). From such simply-simples, we then reason to 
proper, yet complex, concepts of God (e.g., ens inﬁ nitum). Angels, 
on the other hand, as well as certain humans, distinctly cognize the 
divine essence under the aspect of divinity through intelligible spe-
cies proper to God, which we will discuss below. 
Aquinas, however, might respond at this point that the angel 
recognizes God in itself as the image, instead of reasoning to one 
thing from another49. Thus, such images (he would argue) are im-
mune to the requirements of discursive reasoning. They enable the 
angel to grasp both cause and effect in a single intuitive gaze instead 
of running hither and thither between extremes. Aquinas cites the 
example of seeing both a thing and its image at the same time, as 
when one sees an object and its image simultaneously in a mirror50.
But Scotus’s critique of analogy from above still stands: 
namely, how could cognition of God shine-forth, even indistinctly, 
in conceptual contents derived from creatures, if they do not con-
tain it essentially or virtually?51 A creature’s essence as image cannot 
48. SCOTUS, Lectura cit., I, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 1-2, n. 27. 
49. AQUINAS, De Veritate cit., q. 8, a. 15, resp. and ad 6. 
50. AQUINAS, ST cit., I, q. 58, a. 3, ad. 1.
51. “Et conﬁ rmatur ratio, quia ‘obiectum’: praeter conceptum suum proprium adae-
quatum, et inclusum in ipso altero duorum modorum praedictorum, nihil potest 
cognosci ex isto obiecto nisi per discursum; sed discursus praesupponit cogni-
tionem istius simplicis ad quod discurritur. Formetur igitur ratio sic, quia nul-
lum obiectum facit conceptum simplicem proprium, in isto intellectu, conceptum 
simplicem proprium alterius obiecti, nisi contineat illud aliud obiectum essen-
tialiter vel virtualiter; obiectum autem creatum non continet increatum essen-
tialiter vel virtualiter, et hoc sub ea ratione sub qua sibi attribuitur, ut ‘posterius 
essentialiter’ attribuitur ‘priori essentialiter’,-quia contra rationem ‘posterioris 
essentialiter’ est includere virtualiter suum prius, et patet quod obiectum creatum 
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analogically represent the divine essence, even indistinctly, because 
such an essence would be of a higher order of being than it. The 
object and its image simultaneously seen in a mirror both share a 
univocal form, unlike the angelic image and its analogically superior 
exemplar. 
Before discussing the mechanisms of such angelic cognition 
further, we must stress that Scotus does not deny that creatures are 
images of God. Instead, he shows that their discovery as images 
requires prior knowledge of the related terms52. To grasp their imi-
tation of the divine essence, we already must know that which they 
imitate. (Even if God only rationally relates to creatures, their real 
asymmetrical mimetic relation requires knowledge of the imitated 
term.) They are, in effect, reminders of the divine. An angel, or any 
ﬁ nite being for that matter, must be understood for the absolute 
thing that it is prior to understanding its relations of participation 
or imitation. This is because, Scotus argues, a thing is not a being 
because it imitates another or participates in its being53.
Behind Scotus’s critique of images lies a deeper claim concern-
ing the extent to which the relational structures of created beings 
shines-forth in an understanding of them qua being. That is, can we 
consider a being qua being (whether ourselves or another) without 
comprehending its mimetic or participatory constitution? His an-
swer, while subtle, is yes.
He argues that a created being’s ratiﬁ cation qua being (ratitudo) 
lies not in terms of its relation to another54. A being is a being, an ens 
ratum, formally of itself. We do not need to understand the matrix 
of its causal relations—what it imitates, or how it participates—in 
order to comprehend its formal constitution as a being (even as a ﬁ -
nite or an accidental one!). Only after we have understood the terms 
non essentialiter continent increatum secundum aliquid omnino sibi proprium et 
non commune; ergo non facit conceptum simplicem et proprium enti increato.” 
SCOTUS, Ordinatio cit., I, d. 3, p. 1, q. 2, n. 35.
52. SCOTUS, Ordinatio cit., I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 4, n. 575.
53. SCOTUS, Ordinatio cit., I, d. 3, p. 2, q. unica, n. 326.
54. SCOTUS, Lectura cit., I, d. 8, p. 1, q. 3, nn. 63-65.
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can we subsequently understand their relations55. Thus, despite the 
fundamental dependency of creatures upon God as that which they 
imitate, we can understand them for the absolute things that they 
are without understanding them as images of God. 
Remember, the structure of an image requires understanding 
something’s imitation of and reference to another as its exemplar. 
Scotus thus reduces a creature’s asymmetrical relation of imitation 
to a feature of its being known subsequent to cognition of its ratitudo 
for the absolute thing that it is56. This brings us to the question of 
how an angel can cognize God without either reﬂ ecting upon itself 
as an imago Dei or discursively reasoning from univocal concepts.
3. ANGELIC COGNITION OF THE DIVINE ESSENCE 
If an angel naturally knows itself for the absolute thing that it is and 
yet does not recognize itself as an imago Dei, nor does it engage in 
wayfarer’s demonstrative reasoning from vestiges, then, it seems, 
angelic knowledge (notitia) falls short of ours. Angels would rely 
on supernatural cognition of God alone. In response to this issue, 
Scotus argues against both Henry and Aquinas that a created intel-
lect can achieve natural and distinct notitia of the divine essence57. 
Such cognition, he maintains, results from an intelligible species 
distinctly representing the divine essence under the aspect of divin-
ity. But this immediately raises the question of how angels obtain 
such intelligible species if not through abstraction from phantasms. 
Furthermore, how can such a distinct and natural acquaintance with 
the divine essence be distinguished from supernatural beatitude? 
In terms of this second question, Stephen Dumont has shown 
perhaps more than anyone else the centrality of Scotus’s distinction 
between abstractive and intuitive cognition in answering this quan-
dary58. An angel can have a species distinctly representing the divine 
55. Ibidem. 
56. For further discussion of this matter, see SCOTUS, Ordinatio cit., I, d. 3, q. 4, n. 326.
57. SCOTUS, Quodlibetal cit., q. 14, a. 3, n. 79.
58. S. D. DUMONT, Theology as a Science and Duns Scotus’s Distinction between Intuitive 
and Abstractive Cognition, “Speculum” 64/3 (July 1989) 579-599.
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essence insofar as it does not represent it as existing and present. 
Such notitia is thus abstractive, not intuitive59. It is distinct, how-
ever, insofar as it does not require a complex of common concepts 
assembled to form a proper concept of God, as for example, we do 
in the wayfarer state60. In this manner, Scotus can distinguish such 
cognition from supernatural beatitude. 
This returns us to the ﬁ rst question: namely, how do angels 
obtain such an intelligible species in the ﬁ rst place? Scotus answers 
that “most likely” such intelligible species are imparted to their in-
tellect of angels from the beginning (inditam esse intellectui angeli a 
principio)61. He explains that such intelligible species, although not 
following from the nature of the angel itself as an attribute, are nev-
ertheless “natural.” It is natural as opposed to supernatural because 
God gives the perfection to the angel at the time (mora) of its ﬁ rst 
creation. Unlike supernatural grace and glory, however, such cogni-
tion does not require the actual presence of the divine essence as its 
cause. Although originally imparted by God, such species remains 
even once the divine essence has withdrawn its immediate causal 
presence62. 
The reason why angels continue to enjoy such a divine remain-
der, whereas we (for the most part) do not, cannot be explained in 
terms of hierarchical superiority of angelic cognition over ours63. 
Although our current wayfarer condition might suggest otherwise, 
the human intellect by nature is not limited to the cognition of ma-
terial quiddities64. Scotus rejects this view on the grounds that were 
our intellect limited in such a way, it would require the formation 
of an altogether new power in its post-mortem state65.
59. SCOTUS, Ordinatio cit., II, d. 3, p. 2, q. 2, n. 324.
60. SCOTUS, Lectura cit., II, d. 3, p. 2, q. 2, nn. 285-290.
61. SCOTUS, Ordinatio cit., II, d. 3, p. 2, q. 2, n. 325.
62. Even an angel’s “morning cognition” (cognitio matutina), or cognition of creatures 
as they exist in the divine Word, can be considered natural. SCOTUS, Ordinatio 
cit., II, d. 3, p. 2, q. 2, n. 329.
63. SCOTUS, Lectura cit., II, d. 1, q. 6, nn. 289-293. Here he argues that angels differ 
from the soul in terms of species, not however in terms of their intellect or will. 
64. SCOTUS, Lectura cit., I, q. 3, p. 1, qq. 1-2, nn. 35-49. See also SCOTUS, Reportatio 
cit., I-A, d. 3, q. 1, nn. 17-22.
65. SCOTUS, Reportatio cit., I-A, d. 3, q. 1, n. 18.
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He argues as follows: being qua being is the adequate object 
of our intellect—as seen from wayfarer metaphysics; and nothing 
prohibits our intellect even in this state from pushing-on to seek 
satisfaction of its natural desire in a supernatural vision of God;66 
therefore, divine volition can cause such vision and its subsequent 
effects without destroying the nature of the human intellect67. The 
cognitive difference between angelic and human cognition results 
from our current need to abstract from phantasms, due to our in-
tellect’s embodied state as opposed to any fundamental intellectual 
incapacity68. (For this reason, as we shall see, the intellect of a post-
raptured wayfarer is not elevated with a fundamentally new habit, 
but remains the same power.)
In the case of angels, what they knew in the period before their 
subsequent beatiﬁ cation or damnation remains (manet)69. As Scotus 
explains, angels have not been wounded (vulnerati) in the same way 
that humans have, and thus they retain a natural habitual cognition 
of the divine essence70. Unwounded, they retain whatever has been 
given to them at their creation. This means that an angel’s memory 
habitually contains intelligible species, including a species distinctly 
representing the divine essence71. From such species contained in 
the memory, their intellect can produce a concept, or (as Scotus 
puts it in more Augustinian terms) express a mental word. The mental 
word is actual knowledge in the understanding (notitia actualis in in-
66. SCOTUS, Quodlibetal cit., q. 6, a, 1, n. 22. See A. B. WOLTER, The Natural Desire 
for the Supernatural in M. MCCORD ADAMS (ed.), The Philosophical Theology of John 
Duns Scotus (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1990) 125-147.
67. SCOTUS, Lectura cit., I, q. 3, p. 1, qq. 1-2, n. 44. 
68. SCOTUS, Lectura cit., I, q. 3, p. 1, qq. 1-2 n. 46. For a more extensive discussion of 
this point, see A. B. WOLTER, The Natural Desire for the Supernatural cit. 
69. He distinguishes three times (morae) for an angel: creation, in which there is a 
uniformity of angels; difformity, in which the good angels act meritoriously and 
the bad defy God; and an end (terminus), at which the good are conﬁ rmed in 
supernatural beatitude and the bad are damned. SCOTUS, Lectura cit., II, dd. 4-5, 
qq. 1-2, n. 33. 
70. “Dico tunc ad questionem: quid [angeli] ipsi noverunt in illa mora ante lapsum, 
Deus novit; sed tamen cognitio naturalis habitualis de Deo adhuc manet, quia non 
sunt vulnerati in naturalibus, licet in moralibus.” SCOTUS, Lectura cit., II, d. 3, p. 
2, q. 2, n. 291.
71. SCOTUS, Reportatio cit., I-A, d. 3, q. 5, n. 160. 
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telligentia) as generated by the memory72. (Under the aspect of being 
a product, which in the case of created intellects encompasses all 
knowledge, actual knowledge is coextensive with the word.) Unlike 
us in our current condition, the angel can immediately speak such 
a mental word without the mediation of a mental picture73. Thus 
an angel can have a natural cognitive habit of the divine essence 
because what has been imparted to it from the beginning remains 
even once the giver has withdrawn its presence. Furthermore, the 
angel does not need to abstract and construct an indistinct concept 
of God from vestiges found in the sensible world. 
On this basis, Scotus can conclude that angels neither lack nat-
ural cognition about God, which had been the concern addressed 
above; nor is their cognition the confused cognition of the way-
farer from common transcendental concepts. If latter were the true, 
Scotus argues, they would have no more perfect cognition than I 
have. We must emphasize Scotus’s use of the ﬁ rst person singular 
pronoun “ego,” which distinguishes his own knowledge from the 
greatest knowledge possible for humans, even in the wayfarer state. 
Like the angel, the ecstatic (raptus) wayfarer can achieve intuitive 
cognition of the divine essence, while remaining a wayfarer. Its cog-
nitive power remains unchanged because it is not limited to material 
quiddities. 
To make his case, he cites II Corinthians 12, which recounts 
Paul’s rapturous vision of God. As important as the vision itself is, 
once the vision has ended, Scotus speculates that Paul’s memory 
records a species of the object seen in a manner comparable to the 
angel retaining natural and distinct (yet abstractive) cognition of the 
divine essence74. Such an intelligible species retained by the post-ec-
static wayfarer distinctly represents the divine essence75. It remains.
Scotus once again emphasizes the abstractive, as opposed to 
the intuitive, nature of such cognition. Although the cognition 
72. SCOTUS, Reportatio cit., I-A, d. 27, p. 2, q. 1, nn. 110-113.
73. Ibidem, n. 95.
74. SCOTUS, Lectura cit., II, d. 3, p. 2, q. 2, n. 295. Cf. AQUINAS, De Veritate cit., q. 8, 
a. 5, ad. 5. 
75. SCOTUS, Ordinatio cit., II, d. 3, p. 2, q. 2, n. 327.
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originates from a supernatural act caused by divine volition alone 
(because no created being can cause even an abstractive cognition 
of God under the aspect of divinity76), what results and remains is 
natural cognition. Like the angel, the post-ecstatic wayfarer’s cog-
nition is natural insofar as the divine essence shines-forth in the 
intellect, not on account of its actual presence, but by means of an 
intelligible species. This caveat distinguishes such cognition from 
supernatural beatitude. Both angelic and human intellects qua ﬁ nite 
intellect can express a mental word distinctly representing the divine 
essence. Against both Aquinas and Henry, Scotus thus can maintain 
that angels have distinct and natural notitia of God by means of in-
telligible species. They can speak a mental word proper to the divine 
essence as divine without the actual presence of God. 
As a ﬁ nal note, we must add that although ﬁ nite intellects can 
cognize the divine essence under the aspect of divinity and as a this, 
they do not naturally cognize its trinity77. The latter requires intui-
tive cognition of the divine essence as existing and present. Unlike 
the face-to-face encounter of the beatiﬁ c vision, abstractive cognition 
represents its object distinctly according to a proxy (i.e., a represent-
ing species), but does not include the essence’s modes of existence. 
This is possible, as Scotus explains, because existence does not 
add anything to the intensity or clarity of our concept78. We might 
conceive an essence with complete conceptual distinctness and clar-
ity without conceiving that and how it exists. Instead, Scotus tells us, 
existence indicates how the concept is posited or extended. Existence 
is but a mode of essences79. One thus can distinctly conceive the 
divine essence according to its transcendental magnitude, and yet 
76. SCOTUS, Quodlibetal cit., q. 14, a. 2, nn. 36-37 and Reportatio cit., I-A, d. 3, q. 1, nn. 
41-43.
77. SCOTUS, Lectura cit., II, d. 3, p. 2, q. 2, n. 307. 
78. SCOTUS, Reportatio cit., I-A, d. 2, p. 1, qq. 1-3, n. 74.
79. Scotus famously denies any real distinction between esse and essentia. He instead 
opts for a modal distinction between the two. He states: “[...] one can say that the 
essence and the existence in creatures are like quiddity and its mode. Therefore 
they are distinct. However, in God existence pertains to the concept of essence 
and is predicated in the ﬁ rst mode of per se predication, so that the proposition as-
serting this would be ﬁ rst and immediate, and all other propositions would follow 
from this, as it appears in I, dist. 2.” SCOTUS, Quodlibetal cit. Addition 1.11. 
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not cognize its trinity as the Trinity of distinct divine persons. The 
distinct personal supposita, according to Scotus, do not add to this 
magnitude. In short, alongside a distinct conception of the divine 
intellect naturally cognized by means of a representing species, ﬁ nite 
intellects do not retain a memory of its modes of existing in supposita.
If a ﬁ nite intellect can distinctly represent the divine essence 
according to this inﬁ nite magnitude, one might wonder what more 
does supernatural beatitude offer? As existing and present, the bea-
tiﬁ c object cannot be more satisfying on account of greater concep-
tual clarity. Instead, the face-to-face encounter of intuitive cognition 
satisﬁ es the will insofar as its beloved object stands before it in the 
ﬂ esh as present and existing. Only once the will comes face-to-face 
with its object can such a supernatural object fully satisfy it. In this 
respect, Scotus can preserve the distinct natural notitia of angels 
and certain wayfarers, without demeaning the supernatural excess 
of intuitive beatiﬁ c cognition. 
4. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, we have seen how as part of his general critique of 
the theory of analogy Scotus curtails the image as a means of under-
standing God. Neither angels nor humans can simply reﬂ ect upon 
their essence and come to know God as its exemplar. Instead, Scotus 
argues, wayfarers require a univocal concept of being from which 
they can construct a proper, yet complex, concept of God. Angels, 
however, know God through the representing species of abstractive 
cognition, which they retain “from the beginning.” They possess a 
science of theology with God under the proper aspect of deity (sub 
propria ratione deitatis) as its subject80. Such a propter quid science, 
which is actual for angels and possible for us in the wayfarer state, 
may appear to violate the restriction on beatitude short of super-
natural access. Despite this elevation of angelic and some human 
cognition, Scotus nevertheless safeguards the supernatural beatiﬁ c 
vision by means of his unique understanding of intuitive cognition.
80. See, for example, SCOTUS, Reportatio cit., I-A, Prologue. 

